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RECENT CASES

murder statutes specifically exempt justifiable and excusable homicide25 It
seems that such an exemption should be implied in the Pennsylvania law.
The extreme position of the Pennsylvania court in the principal case is
regrettable. It appears to be an unreasonable extension of an already unreasonable rule, and the anticipated effect would be to stamp as murderers
all felons who are remotely associated with a homicide in the course of committing their felonious act. Such a result is obviously unjust and entirely
lacking in logic. The desire to discourage the occurence of felonies is unquestionably a highly commendable motive, but in selecting a means to that
end, the courts should never cease to temper their decisions with logical reasoning, where the legislative mandate permits.
GEORGE

INSURANCE -

ASSIGNMENT OF POLICY -

DYNES

VALIDITY OF ORAL ASSIGNMENT

-

The plaintiff's husband obtained an insurance policy on his life, named his wife
as beneficiary, and delivered the policy to her. He later took possession of the
policy without the plaintiff's knowledge or consent and substituted his sister,
the defendant, as beneficiary. Upon her husband's death the plaintiff sought
to have herself declared the beneficiary of the policy, alleging an executed oral
agreement under which she was to be named beneficiary in return for the
payment by her of the premiums. On appeal from a summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the court held that a cause of action was stated. An
oral agreement to name a beneficiary, plus manual delivery of the policy with
intent to make a gift, amounted to a valid and enforceable assignment of the
policy; that this assignment was not within the statute of frauds; and that a
constructive tnst resulted for the benefit of the plaintiff. Katzman v. Aetna
Life Insurance Co., 137 N.Y.S.2d 583, 128 N.E.2d 307 (1955).
Generally, full performance will take an oral agreement out of the statute
ef frauds,1 provided it is established by clear proof.2 The statute may not be
successfully interposed as a defense in equity where it would aid in the
perpetration of a fraud,3 or in cases involving parol 4 or constructive) trusts.
A parol assignment of an insurance policy does not fall within the statute
whether made as a giftG or for consideration. Delivery, which is essential to
25. N. Y. Penal Law §1044, (1950): "The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifiable, is murder in the first degree, when committed . . . by a person ,:ngaged in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit a felony, either upon or affecting
the person killed or otherwise." (Emphasis added).
1. Jones v. Jones, 333 Mo. 478, 63 S.W.2d 146 (1933); Bayreuther v. Reinisch, 34 N.Y.
S.2d 674, 677 (1942), aff'd. 47 N.E.2d 959 (1943); Considine v. Considine, 7 N. Y. S.2d.
834 (1938); Burns v. McCormick, 233 N.Y. 230, 135 N.E. 273 (1922) (Part performance is insufficient unless it is unequivocally referable to ihe agreement).
2. Accord Stolar v. Turner, 237. Iowa 593, 21 N.W.2d 544 (1946).
3. Fleming v. Dillon, 370 Ill. 325, 18 N.E.2d. 910 (1938); Keystone Hardware Corp.
v. Tague, 245 N.Y. 79, 158 N.E. "27- (1927)
(Plaintiff-vendee not permitted to plead
statute of frauds in action to recover purchase price under oral contract to convey land
where defendant-vendor was willing to convey).
4. Blanco v. Velez, 295 N.Y. 224, 66 N.E.2d. 171 (1946).
5. Latham v. Fr. Divine, 299 N.Y. 22, 85 N.E.2d. 168 (1949); Bogart on Trusts,
§56 (2d ed. 1942) (The constructive trust, created in equity, may be based upon oral
evidence).
6. Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Sailor, 47 F.2d 911 (S.D. Cal. 1930); See Cooney v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 235 Minn. 377, 51 N.W.2d. 285 (1952); John Hancock Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Sandrisser, 95 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1950); Young v. Prudential Ins. Co., 131 N.Y.S.
968 (1911).
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the validity of a parol gift,' must be absolute, irrevocable, and intended to
take immediate effect.1 When a gift of an insurance policy is made, the in9
sured loses the right to change the beneficiary, notwithstanding a reservation
0
of that power in the policy.1 The donee acquires a vested interest in the proceeds of the policy" which cannot be divested, changed, or impaired without
2
his consent.'
The holding in the instant case is contrary to the express provisions of section 31 (9) of the New York Personal Property Law. The statute was designed to prevent the perpetration of fraud upon a deceased person's estate
by terminating litigation based on unsupported oral agreements."3 It provides
that every contract to assign, or assignment, or promise to name a beneficiary
14
The court's reason for perof an insurance policy, is void unless in writing.
naitting proof of the parol assignment, in face of this statutory prohibition is
not clear. Much emphasis is placed upon the fact of actual delivery of the
insurance policy. This plus the plaintiff's payment of the premiums, the confidential relation between the husband and wife, and the surreptitious taking
of the policy by the husband in his attempt to change beneficiaries, speak
strongly in favor of the final result.
The assignment to the plaintiff resulted in the complete divestment of the
insured's title to the policy, and made his attempted change of beneficiary
ineffectual. 5 The power to change a beneficiary exists under the policy as a
power of appointment, and when the insured transfers his interest in the policy
this power is extinguished.'O
While the court's decision may be equitable, its apparent effect is to render
the New York statute ineffective.
GENE KRUGER
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UMS PAID DUE TO LACK OF CONSIDERATION - Plaintiff had purchased a public

liability insurance from defendant to insure plaintiff against loss from liabilities
which might arise from the negligent operation of a county hospital. Under
the terms of a statute authorizing recovery of premiums where an insurer has
incurred no risk of loss, plaintiff sought a return of all premiums paid, con7. Ratsch v. Rengel, 180 Md. 196, 23 A.2d. 680 (1942); Guardian Life Ins. Co. v.
Mareczko, 114 N.J.Eq. 369, 168 At]. 642 (1933).
8. Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Mareczko, 114 N.J.Eq. 369, 168 Atl. 642 (1933).
9. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Sandrisser, 95 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1950).
10. Stepson v. Brand, 213 Miss. 826, 58 So.2d. 18 (1952).
11. Cooke v. Cooke, 65 Cal. App.2d 260, 150 P.2d 514 (1944).
12. Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Sailor, 47 F.2d 911 (S.D. Cal. 1930); Miller v. Gulf
Line Ins. Co., 152 Fla. 221, 12 So.2d. 127 (1942); Shepard v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
87 Conn. 500, 89 Atl. 186 (1913).
13. Katzman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 137 N.Y.S.2d 583, 128 N.E.2d 307, 309 (1955).
14. New York Personal Property Law §31 (1943): "Agreements required to be in writing.
Every agreement, promise or undertaking is void, unless it or some note or memorandum
thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith, or by his lawful agent, if such agreement, promisO or undertaking; . . . is a contract to assign or an
assignment, with or without consideration to the promisor, of a life or health or accident
insurance policy, or a promise, with or without consideration to the promisor, to name a
This provision shall not apply to a policy of industrial
beneficiary of any such policy.
life or health or accident, insurance."
15. Stepson v. Brand, 213 Miss. 826, 58 So.2d. 18 (1952); John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Sandrisser, 95 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1950).
16. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Swett, 222 Fed. 200 (6th Cir. 1915); Ehlerman v.
(Ineffectual attempt to change
Bankers' Life Co., 199 Iowa 417, 200 N.W. 408 (1924)
beneficiary held not to be an assignment).

